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Abstract: Structural priming is a useful tool for investigating linguistics representations. 
We argue that structural priming can be extended to the investigation of pragmatic 
representations such as Gricean enrichments. That is not to say priming is without its 
limitations, however. Interpreting a failure to observe priming may not be as simple as 
Branigan & Pickering (B&P) imply. 
We agree with Branigan & Pickering’s (B&P’s) central thesis: Structural priming is a 
good methodological candidate for investigating linguistic representations. Structural 
priming, however, can be used to investigate representations used in pragmatics, as well 
as in semantics and syntax.  
 Bott and Chemla (2016) and Rees and Bott (2015; 2016) find that scalar 
implicatures – the prototypical pragmatic enrichment  can be primed. For example, Bott 
and Chemla showed that sentences with enriched interpretations of some (some  some 
but not all) prime higher rates of enrichment in subsequent target sentences than 
sentences with basic some (where some takes its literal meaning; i.e., some and possibly 
all). These results suggest that another layer of representation could be added to Figure 1 
in B&P, with corresponding links to the lexicon. The representations involved would be 
at the sentence level, (S & not[S']), where S refers to the basic, unenriched sentence, and 
S' to the informationally stronger sentence (a sentence involving a stronger expression, 
e.g., all in the case of some). Evidence that such a representation was independent of
lexical material was given by the demonstration that sentences with implicatures 
associated with one expression, for example, some, could prime implicatures associated 
with another – for example, the numbers (from at least N to exactly N), and evidence of 
links to the lexicon was shown by a lexical boost to the priming effect (some  some 
generated more priming than some  numbers). Finally, evidence that the priming effect 
was independent of the processes accessing the representations was provided by Rees and 
Bott (2016), who showed that production of implicatures could be primed by 
comprehension.  
Why should these results demonstrate a separate level of representation, as 
distinct from the semantic level of B&P? The distinction between semantics and 
pragmatics is fuzzy in the case of scalar implicatures (see so-called Grammatical 
Theories of scalar implicature, e.g., Chierchia  [2013]). There are at least two differences 
 between the representations described above and those included in Figure 1. The first is 
that representations used to generate scalar implicatures must take alternatives as part of 
their input – that is, sentences that the speaker could have said but didn’t, for example, 
sentences involving all instead of some, as Grice (1975) and many others have argued. 
Correspondingly, Rees and Bott (2015) showed that sentences involving the alternative 
prime enrichment just as much as sentences involving the enriched scalar expression, and 
more than sentences involving the unenriched scalar expression. This type of input, and 
corresponding priming effects, do not apply to the semantic representations described by 
B&P. The second difference is that implicature representations are applied optionally (or 
defeasible), as in the standard Gricean model, for example, in the case of comprehension, 
application of the implicature representation would be blocked if the speaker is not 
judged to have had sufficient knowledge to have uttered the stronger expression. The 
sorts of representations discussed by B&P are not optional in the same sense. Overall, 
then, while the use of structural priming so far has been used primarily to discover 
syntactic representations, it also can provide useful insight into how pragmatics can be 
integrated into a representational language system. 
In the remainder of the commentary, we make two methodological comments on 
structural priming. The first is that structural priming provides causal information about 
similarities in representations, whereas many traditional linguistic techniques, such as 
analysis of corpora, provide only correlational information. Bott and Chemla (2016) 
illustrate this. They tested whether expressions that are uncontroversially enriched using 
Gricean mechanisms share derivation properties with other, more debatable implicature 
 enriched meanings. They showed that enriched some primes enriched numbers but not 
enriched plural morphology (+s). Consequently, they argued that some enrichment and 
the numbers shared a common derivation mechanism that was at least partially separate 
from the mechanism used to derive plural enrichment. Previous work addressing this 
question investigated the similarities in the enrichment distributions across expressions 
and context. For example, Horn (1972) observed that the numbers have an enriched 
meaning (exactly N) in the same contexts as some has an enriched meaning (some but not 
all), while Breheny (2008) and others found differences in the distributions. 
Distributional analyses, however, require considering examples in situ, complete with 
linguistic material that may or may not be relevant. Conversely, in structural priming, the 
potentially redundant material can be stripped away (or even investigated, as in the case 
of the lexical boost). The causal inferences that arise from structural priming make it a 
particularly powerful technique for discovering overlapping mechanisms and 
representations across linguistic phenomena. 
The second point relates to the inferences that can be drawn in the absence of a 
priming effect. When two sentences that are hypothesized to use overlapping 
representations fail to prime each other, does this mean that the hypothesized 
representations are inaccessible (i.e., non-existent)? For example, if Bott and Chemla 
(2016) had failed to find that enriched some and numbers primed each other, would this 
constitute evidence that there are no abstract scalar implicature representations? B&P do 
not directly address the issue, but they imply that representations are accessible only if 
they can be primed (sect. 1.4). While it is true that many representations are primable 
 (i.e., they remain active across time), we do not feel that, to be accessible, representations 
necessarily must be primable. Primability confers many advantages, including the 
facilitation of alignment and prediction in dialogue (Pickering & Garrod 2004, 2014). For 
some representations, however, these factors may not be important. Such representations 
would clearly not be detectible using structural priming methodology but might be 
accessible using other techniques. Therefore, a failure to observe a priming effect is an 
ambiguous result: Either the representation is not accessible, or it is not primeable. This is 
problematic, because a weakness in the alternative hypothesis makes null structural 
priming effects difficult to interpret and positive findings less persuasive (e.g., a “file 
drawer” effect is more likely when publication of a null effect is difficult).  
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